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I. INTRODUCTION
Telecommunications laws1 and regulations2 in the United States and
1. See, e.g., Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(codified at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). For background on the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, see Aimee M. Adler, Competition in Telephony: Perception or Reality?
Current Barriers to The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 7 J.L. & POL’Y 571 (1999);
Michael Glover and Donna Epps, Is The Telecommunications Act of 1996 Working?, 52
ADMIN. L. REV. 1013 (2000); Robert M. Frieden, The Telecommunications Act of 1996:
Predicting the Winners and Losers, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 11 (1996); Thomas G.
Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 123 (1996); Michael
I. Meyerson, Ideas of the Marketplace: A Guide to the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 49
FED. COMM. L.J. 251 (1997); John C. Roberts, The Sources of Statutory Meaning: An
Archaeological Case Study of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 53 SMU L. REV. 143
(2000).
2. The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC” or “Commission”) has crafted a
basic and enhanced services dichotomy, with the former referring to telecommunications,
typically regulated as essential public utility services, and enhanced services, typically
unregulated in view of their nonessential nature. See generally, e.g., Computer III Further
Remand Proceedings, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 6040, 15
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 2017 (1998), on reconsideration, Computer III Remand Proceedings,
Report and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 4289, 15 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 149 (1999), and on
reconsideration, Computer III Further Remand Proceedings, Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 21628, 18
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1344 (1999); Computer III Remand Proceedings, Report and Order, 6
F.C.C.R. 7571, 70 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 121 (1991), vacated in part and remanded,
California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1050 (1995).
On occasion courts participate in crafting service definitions. On several occasions, the court
presiding over the federal government’s antitrust lawsuit against AT&T created service
definitions, including regulated telecommunications and unregulated information services.
See United States v. W. Elec. Co., 714 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1988), rev’d in part, 900 F.2d
283 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. W. Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525 (D.D.C. 1987). The
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in other nations3 historically have established policies based on fixed
service definitions and relatively static assumptions about the industrial
organization of telecommunications and information processing. Vertical,
“top-down” regulatory policies typically ascribe regulated or unregulated
status-based embedded assumptions about market share,4 essentialness,5

Modification of Final Judgment (“MFJ”), which established the terms and conditions for the
divestiture of the local Bell operating companies (“BOCs”) from AT&T, defined
“telecommunications” as:
[T]he transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information
of the user’s choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as
sent and received, by means of electromagnetic transmission [with or without
benefit of any closed transmission] medium, including all instrumentalities,
facilities, apparatus, and services (including the collection, storage, forwarding,
switching, and delivery of such information) essential to such transmission.
United States v. W. Elec. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 229 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). The MFJ defines “information service” as
the “offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing,
retrieving, utilizing, or making available information which may be conveyed via
telecommunications.” “Information” is defined as “knowledge or intelligence represented by
any form of writing, signs, . . . pictures, sounds, or other symbols.” Id. at 229.
3. See Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7
March 2002 on Access to, and Interconnection of, Electronic Communications Networks
and Associated Facilities, 2002 O.J. (L 108), available at http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/en/archive/2002/l_10820020424en.html [hereinafter New European Regulatory
Framework]; see also Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on a Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks
and Services, 2000 O.J. (C 365E) 198, available at http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/
telecompolicy/review99/com2000-393en.pdf. See Information Society Web site, at
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/telecoms/regulatory/new_rf/index_en.htm,
for an overview of the new European regulatory framework.
4. Telephone companies incur federal and state common carrier economic regulation
based initially on their monopoly market share. “The decree [divesting the AT&T Bell
system of its local operating companies] did nothing, however, to increase competition in
the persistently monopolistic local markets, which were thought to be the root of natural
monopoly in the telecommunications industry.” Verizon Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 122 S. Ct.
1646, 1654 (2002).
5. Public utility regulation, like that applied to telephone companies, applies here
because of the view that government must intervene in the absence of competition to ensure
fair prices, universal access, and high service quality.
Until the 1990’s, local phone service was thought to be a natural monopoly. States
typically granted an exclusive franchise in each local service area to a local
exchange carrier (LEC), which owned, among other things, the local loops (wires
connecting telephones to switches), the switches (equipment directing calls to
their destinations), and the transport trunks (wires carrying calls between
switches) that constitute a local exchange network. Technological advances,
however, have made competition among multiple providers of local service seem
possible, and Congress recently ended the longstanding regime of state-sanctioned
monopolies.
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371 (1999).
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pervasiveness,6 and use of public resources.7 These policies do not fully
segregate content from the conduit used to deliver the content, with the
result of applying different degrees of government oversight based on the
method for delivering possibly the same content.8 These policies also create
incentives for regulatory opportunism, i.e., exploiting loopholes to qualify
for reduced regulatory burdens and higher profit margins.9
Under longstanding regulatory regimes, providers of basic
telecommunication services fit under the common carrier classification,10

6. Mass media regulation derives, in part, on its perceived reach and social impact:
[A]t least one set of competing claims to the protection of . . . [the First]
Amendment derives from the fact that, because of the limited number of broadcast
frequencies available and the potentially pervasive impact of the electronic media,
“The people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their
collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and
purposes of the First Amendment.”
Columbia Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 182-83 (1973) (citing
Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)).
7. Extensive broadcast regulation attempts to secure a public interest dividend for use
of public spectrum, and cable television regulation includes a franchise fee for use of public
rights-of-way. “Local franchising was the first form of cable regulation, arising from the
need of localities to control access to public rights-of-way and easements and to minimize
disruption to traffic and other public activity from the laying of cable lines.” Denver Area
Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 788 (1996) (citation omitted).
8. See Robert Corn-Revere, New Technology and the First Amendment: Breaking the
Cycle of Repression, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 247 (1994):
Consider the following scenario:
A federal regulator walks into a room and is confronted with five television sets,
each displaying the same program. The show features a steamy sex scene between
a man and a woman, complete with nudity, adult language, and lots of sweat.
Although transparent to the viewer, each television is fed via a different
transmission source. The first television is receiving a terrestrial broadcast
transmission, the second obtains the images by coaxial cable, the third is
connected to a fiber optic common carrier network, the fourth is hooked to a VCR,
and the fifth is receiving a direct broadcast satellite (DBS) feed. Leaving aside any
questions of federal versus local jurisdiction and assuming that the images are not
obscene, what is the regulator’s constitutional authority to control these images?
The answer is, it depends.
Id. at 249.
9. See Rob Frieden, Wither Convergence: Legal, Regulatory, and Trade Opportunism
in Telecommunications, 18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 171 (2002).
10. Common carriers provide essential public utility services on a nondiscriminatory
basis, typically subject to extensive economic regulation to ensure just and reasonable rates.
Section 153(44) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (47 U.S.C. § 153(44)
(2000)) defines “telecommunications carrier” as a carrier offering “telecommunications
service,” and Section 153(46) (47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (2000)), states that “telecommunications
services” are common carrier services. For extensive background on the history of common
carriage, see James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54
FED. COMM. L.J. 225 (2002).
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while providers of enhanced and information services11—which add value
to basic telecommunications12—fit under the substantially unregulated
designation of a private carrier. These basic/enhanced and
telecommunications/information service dichotomies worked when markets
aligned in a neat, vertical array with limited horizontal market integration.
In such a nonconvergent “Old World Order,” markets and regulatory
policies could fit into broad categories like broadcasting, cable television,
common carrier telephony, private carrier, and nonessential or private
services.13 The lack of integration made it feasible and possibly justifiable
for the application of different regulatory requirements.
Technological innovations and industry developments jeopardize
11. 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2000):
“[I]nformation service” means the offering of a capability for generating,
acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making
available information via telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing,
but does not include any use of any such capability for the management, control,
or operation of a telecommunications system or the management of a
telecommunications service.
Id.
12. The FCC defines “enhanced service” as “any offering over the telecommunications
network which is more than a basic transmission service.” Amendment of Section 64.702 of
the Comm’n’s Rules and Regs. (Second Computer Inquiry), Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d
384, para. 97, 47 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 669 (1980). The FCC’s definition, more specifically,
is service that “combines basic service with computer processing applications that act on the
format, content, code, protocol or similar aspects of the subscriber’s transmitted
information, or provide the subscriber with additional, different, or restructured information,
or involve subscriber interaction with stored information.” Id. para. 5. Practically speaking,
the FCC’s enhanced services definition is compatible with the information services
classification contained in the Telecommunications Act of 1996: “The Commission has
determined that information services consist of all services that the Commission previously
considered to be enhanced services. The Commission, however, also has determined that
while all enhanced services are information services, not all information services are
enhanced services.” Robert Cannon, Where Internet Service Providers and Telephone
Companies Compete: A Guide to the Computer Inquiries, Enhanced Service Providers and
Information Service Providers, 9 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 49, 55 (2001) (citing
Implementation of Sections 255 and 251(a)(2) of the Communications Act of 1934, as
Enacted by the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Access to Telecommunications Service,
Telecommunications Equipment and Customer Premises Equipment by Persons with
Disabilities, 64 Fed. Reg. 63,235 (1999) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. Parts 1, 6 and 7); see
also Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, First Report and Order and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 21905, para. 102, 5 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 696 (1996)).
13. Even prior to the current acceleration of technological and marketplace
convergence, some commentators objected to nonuniform and inconsistent regulation and
jurisprudence as between, for example, the print and broadcast media. See Thomas G.
Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Converging First Amendment Principles For Converging
Communications Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1719 (1995); Mark S. Nadel, A Technology
Transparent Theory of the First Amendment and Access to Communications Media, 43 FED.
COMM. L.J. 157, 182-83 (1991).
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these convenient dichotomies, because legislators and regulators cannot
easily craft service definitions that survive rapidly changing conditions, and
because convergence expands the reach of technologies and versatility of
services. Converging technologies and markets make it quite possible for a
single venture to own or lease facilities capable of operating across
previously discrete and mutually exclusive markets. For example, the
Internet seamlessly blends content and conduit, and likewise makes it
possible for Internet service providers (“ISPs”) and other ventures to offer a
variety of services that fit within many of the existing service definitions
that include telecommunications, cable, and information services. What
these ventures offer, how they offer them, and how they characterize what
they offer depends more on regulatory definitions and classifications than
on the basis of operational efficiency or functionality. For example, a
heavily regulated venture may seek the safe harbor of less regulation in
exchange for creating a separate subsidiary,14 even though it might lose
operational synergies.15 A less regulated or unregulated venture may avoid
triggering regulation by carefully handicapping the competitiveness of its
offerings vis-à-vis regulated services so that it might continue to qualify for
favorable governmental treatment.
Differences in regulatory classifications for functionally equivalent
services have created incentives for stakeholders to find and qualify for

14. SBC and, until recently, Verizon provided advanced services through separate
subsidiaries that were treated as non-dominant under FCC orders conditionally approving
major mergers. See GTE Corp. and Bell Atlantic Corp. Consent to Transfer Control of
Domestic and International Sections 214 and 310, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15
F.C.C.R. 14032, 20 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 989 (2000); Ameritech Corp. and SBC Comm.
Inc. Consent to Transfer Control of Corps. Holding Comm’n Licenses and Lines,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 14712, 18 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1999)
[hereinafter Ameritech and SBC Consent Order]. These subsidiaries had been deemed nondominant, and thereby subject to less regulation in their provision of broadband services.
However, in January 2001, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
held that data affiliates of incumbent local exchange carriers (“ILECs”) are subject to all
obligations of Section 251(c) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, including
the requirement to unbundle network elements and to make them available for resale by
competitors. The court overturned the Commission’s determination in the Ameritech and
SBC Consent Order, because the separate advanced services affiliate could be deemed an
integral part of the ILEC and therefore subject to Section 251(c)(4) of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 that requires such carriers to offer at wholesale rates any
telecommunications service that the incumbent carrier retails to noncarriers. Ass’n of
Comm. Enters. v. FCC, 235 F.3d 662 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Ameritech and SBC
Consent Order, supra.
15. See Robert W. Crandall & J. Gregory Sidak, Is Structural Separation of Incumbent
Local Exchange Carriers Necessary for Competition?, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 335 (2002)
(advocating that structural separation is inefficient and unnecessary).
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designations that trigger the least regulation,16 or alternatively the greatest
degree of benefits conferred by law or regulation, e.g., subsidies,
exemption from financial obligations, or qualified immunity from
competition. Stakeholders can manipulate the vertical regulatory structure
and qualify for the “best” product or service chain classification, even as
other ventures, offering functional equivalents, incur more burdensome
requirements based on static assumptions about their market share, past
actions, or their comparatively less effective advocacy in legislative,
judicial, or regulatory forums.
The European Commission has considered whether a horizontal
regulatory and policy orientation would provide a better outcome.17 Such a
“side-by-side” approach seeks to establish regulatory parity among
similarly situated operators. It attempts to use a harmonized regulatory
approach that makes a functional assessment of what a company currently
provides and whether it possesses market power, rather than who provides
a service and that provider’s “legacy” regulatory status.18 Despite greater
meshing of content and conduit in a convergent environment, horizontal
regulation would concentrate on the hierarchy of identifiable layers
involved in the provision of information and telecommunications, including
a network/physical layer (the wired, wireless, or optical medium), services
carried over such networks (one-way, two-way, narrowband, or
broadband), and applications/content (voice, data, video, or Internet) riding
at the top of the layered stack.19 Such a horizontal orientation would trigger

16. See James H. Lister, The Rights of Common Carriers and the Decision Whether to
Be a Common Carrier or a Non-Regulated Communications Provider, 53 FED. COMM. L.J.
91 (2000).
17. See New European Regulatory Framework, supra note 3. For background on the
European Union horizontal approach to convergent networks, see generally Commission of
the European Communities, Information Society, Regulatory Framework, available at
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/telecoms/regulatory/index_en.htm
(last
visited Nov. 29, 2002).
18. “A regulatory model based on who provides the services is no longer an appropriate
model in the broadband world.” Antonia M. Apps & Thomas M. Dailey, Non-Regulation of
Advanced Internet Services, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 681, 683 (2000).
19. Data networks, including the Internet, fit well into a horizontal model for purposes
of understanding the structure and technical interfaces needed to achieve connections. The
Open Systems Interconnection (“OSI”) Model provides a helpful example of horizontal
modeling:
OSI[] is a standard description or “reference model” for how messages should be
transmitted between any two points in a telecommunication network. Its purpose
is to guide product implementers so that their products will consistently work with
other products. The reference model defines seven layers of functions that take
place at each end of a communication. Although OSI is not always strictly
adhered to in terms of keeping related functions together in a well-defined layer,
many if not most products involved in telecommunication make an attempt to
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a substantial revamping of regulatory treatment as it would possibly free
some ventures that have historically operated under extensive regulation,
even as it imposes new regulatory burdens on ventures historically exempt
from regulation. A horizontal orientation also would establish a regulatory
regime based on how technologies function and would foreclose the need
to make semantic distinctions between such converging concepts as
telecommunications used in the provision of information services and
telecommunications services provided directly to users.
This Article will assess the viability of different vertical regulatory
regimes in an increasingly convergent environment. It will review several
recent FCC proceedings that have generated opportunities for stakeholders
to avoid regulatory parity by qualifying for reduced regulation based on
service definitions. The Article will provide current examples of how the
changed circumstances, like convergence, have forced ad hoc recrafting, or
interpretations of definitions in an increasingly difficult effort to sustain a
top-down regulatory regime. The Article also will examine proposals under
consideration by the European Union to shift from a vertical regulatory
structure to a harmonized, horizontal one.
The Article also will consider whether a horizontal regulatory
approach can reduce the number of regulatory asymmetries and
inconsistencies, such as those apparent when telephone companies bear
common carrier regulatory duties when providing Internet access while
cable television ventures do not. A regulatory structure, based on service
function instead of service definition or pedigree, offers a theoretically
pleasing, but politically unacceptable alternative. It would solve the current
inability for courts to distinguish between cable television as a medium for
providing information services versus a medium for delivering
telecommunications and conventional cable services. Under the current
regulatory regimes, cable television operators incur different regulatory
burdens and benefits as a function of which vertical regulation applies, viz,
extensively regulated common carrier telecommunications, partially
regulated cable services, and largely unregulated information services.
The Article concludes that a horizontal regulatory structure may not
secure sufficient political support given the risk of extending new burdens
on previously unregulated activities even though regulators could calibrate
and ease the burdens to the lowest degree still able to protect the public

describe themselves in relation to the OSI model. It is also valuable as a single
reference view of communication that furnishes everyone a common ground for
education and discussion.
SearchNetworking.com Definitions, available at http://searchnetworking.techtarget.com/
sDefinition/0,,sid7_gci212725,00.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2002).
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interest. The horizontal orientation, however, makes better sense in a
convergent, increasingly Internet-dominated marketplace and also provides
a more intelligent model than the existing vertical orientation that creates
unsustainable service and regulatory distinctions.

II. DEFECTS IN VERTICAL REGULATORY MODELS
With the proliferation of content delivery options over time,
legislatures, regulatory agencies, and courts have purposefully created
different models for government oversight. These models differentiate the
scope of regulation based on perceived need to supersede market forces in
view of conditions specific to a particular medium. For example,
broadcasters in many nations enjoy less freedom of expression than their
print counterparts based on the view that they operate using a scarce public
resource, the electromagnetic radio spectrum. More broadly, nations may
calibrate regulatory oversight based on expansive notions of the public
interest,20 national security,21 economic assumptions about the marketplace
and sustainability of competition,22 or empirical observations of market
conditions.23
20. For example, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 directed the FCC to review its
rules every even-numbered year and repeal or modify those found to be no longer in the
public interest. See, e.g., 2000 Biennial Reg. Review of Part 68 of the Comm’n’s Rules and
Regs., Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 24944, para. 1, 22 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1117 (2000).
In its comprehensive biennial review of its rules, the Commission seeks “to eliminate
regulations that are no longer necessary because the public interest can be better served
through reliance on market forces.” 2000 Biennial Reg. Review of Part 68 of the Comm’n’s
Rules And Regs., Order on Reconsideration in CC Docket No. 99-216 and Order
Terminating Proceeding in CC Docket No. 98-163, 17 F.C.C.R. 6856, para. 1 (2002).
21. For example, the executive branch of the U.S. government addresses
telecommunications national security and emergency preparedness issues. See Exec. Order
No. 12,472, 49 Fed. Reg. 13,471 (Apr. 3, 1984).
22. “The ‘contestable markets’ literature suggests that even monopolists may behave
competitively if they face the threat of swift entry by effective competitors whenever the
monopolist raises prices above cost or reduces product quality. Thus, potential competition
may, in principle, constrain market power as effectively as actual competition.”
Implementation of Section 11 of the Cable TV Consumer Prot. and Competition Act of
1992, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 17312, para. 69 (2001)
(responding to court reversal and remand of FCC attribution rules limiting a single cable
television firm to a maximum thirty-percent national share of multi-channel video
programming subscribership and a forty-percent vertical limit on carriage of programming).
23. See 2000 Biennial Reg. Review Spectrum Aggregation Limits For Commercial
Mobile Radio Servs., Report and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 22668, para. 32 (2001).
Measures of market concentration in the record show a substantial continuing
decline in concentration in most local CMRS [commercial mobile radio service]
markets. We find that considerable entry has occurred and that meaningful
competition is present, particularly given the presence of such earmarks of
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In the United States, expansive yet inconsistent government oversight
models have developed for print, broadcast, cable television, telephone, and
Internet communications. Purists have objected to such media-specific
modeling, especially as it relates to the First Amendment and other
constitutional guards against government intrusion.24 Some rational
justifications, however, have supported these different models, including
the lack of significant intermodal competition or substitution, and limited
technological and market convergence. In a preconvergent environment,
media-specific regulatory models could apply because citizens, in large
part, looked to different media for different functions, and governments
could craft a plausible rationale for applying varying degrees of oversight
and regulatory burdens based on articulable factors.
Variations in the scope of government intrusion have occurred in the
United States on grounds that decision-makers can distinguish between
speakers based on whether they control the content they deliver, as well as
the nature, reach, and impact of that content. Broadcasting is a pervasive
and intrusive medium.25 Using public spectrum, it has incurred public
trustee status and public interest obligations26 even as business competitors,
such as cable television, qualified for significantly less government
oversight.27 The former bears an obligation to repay the public for use of
competition as falling prices, increasing output, and improving service quality and
options. Specifically, concentration in CMRS markets, as measured by subscriber
share, is falling.
Id. (empirical findings that CMRS markets are competitive).
24. See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 13; Nadel, supra note 13.
25. For example, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the Supreme Court rejected strict
scrutiny threshold for government content regulation and thereby approved of comparatively
more stringent regulation vis-à-vis other forms of speech, based on the view that
broadcasting had a “uniquely pervasive presence” and was “uniquely accessible to
children.” 438 U.S. 726, 748, 749 (1978).
26. “[O]f all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most
limited First Amendment protection.” Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748. In Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, the Supreme Court held that the finiteness of useful broadcasting frequencies
and media scarcity necessitated government allocation and regulation to ensure that
licensees best serve the public interest. 395 U.S. 367, 400-01 (1969).
27. Cable television operators enjoy substantial First Amendment protection when they
engage in expressive conduct, e.g., as speakers and content programmers, and less
protection when they provide a conduit for the speech of others, e.g., retransmission of
broadcast signals. In United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., the Supreme
Court held that mandatory scrambling of signals containing sexually oriented programming,
or limiting access to such content to late-night hours when children do not make up a
significant portion of the cable television viewing audience, violated the First Amendment
as not providing the least restrictive means of restricting speech. 529 U.S. 803, 825-27
(2000). The Court, however, has affirmed as legitimate economic regulation in the public
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radio spectrum through public interest programming,28 while the latter
incurs less regulatory burdens even though it also makes direct payments to
municipalities through franchise fees. 29
A continuum of government oversight reach and regulatory burdens
has developed.30 Broadcasters face the most intrusive level of government
oversight of both economic performance and content, followed by cable
television operators, in light of the potential for adverse economic impact
on broadcasters. Telephone companies incur significant economic
regulation in view of their essential common carrier public utility function,
even though they typically operate as neutral conduits providing carriage of
content created by others. Print media qualifies for the least degree of
government oversight, primarily because it does not use public resources
and serves an essential public interest function in promoting honest and fair
governance. The jurisprudence for Internet-mediated information,
communications, and entertainment (“ICE”) has begun to develop with
preliminary indications favoring limited government intervention whenever
possible.31
interest mandatory carriage of broadcast signals by cable operators. See Turner Brdcst. Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994); Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189
(1997).
28. “The broadcasters, as public trustees, have an obligation in a democratic society to
inform the beneficiaries of the trusteeship, id est, the public, of the different attitudes and
viewpoints which are held by the various groups which make up the community.” Red Lion
Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1976), aff’d, 395 U.S. 367, 401-02 (1969).
29. Municipalities exercise local franchising authority over cable providers by granting
nonexclusive franchises. Under cable franchise agreements, cable providers must pay annual
franchise fees, typically a percentage of their gross revenues. This fee compensates
municipalities, inter alia, for access to public rights-of-way. See Andrea L. Johnson, A City
Guide to Developing, Using, and Regulating Regional Telecommunication Networks Under
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 21 NOVA L. REV. 515, 537 (1997). See 47 U.S.C.
§ 253(c) (2000).
Nothing in this section affects the authority of a State or local government to
manage the public rights-of-way or to require fair and reasonable compensation
from telecommunications providers, on a competitively neutral and
nondiscriminatory basis, for use of public rights-of-way on a nondiscriminatory
basis, if the compensation required is publicly disclosed by such government.
Id.
30. “It is true that our cases have permitted more intrusive regulation of broadcast
speakers than of speakers in other media.” Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 637. “We
have long recognized that each medium of expression presents special First Amendment
problems.” Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748 (citation omitted). See also City of Los Angeles v.
Preferred Comms., Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring: “Different
communications media are treated differently for First Amendment purposes.”);
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1981) (plurality opinion).
31. For example, the Supreme Court has applied a strict scrutiny standard for Internet
content regulation, including statutes designed to protect children. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (holding that statute that conditioned access to Internet-mediated
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III. VERTICAL REGULATION IN APPLICATION
Media-specific regulation operates in a vertical, top-down context.
Governments adopting this model segregate ICE industries into specific
media categories, each with an identifiable and hierarchical product cycle,
or “food chain.” A vertical regulatory model makes little distinction among
various operators in each chain, but big distinctions between chains. As a
result, operators with substantially different market shares may face the
same scope of regulation, even as other operators with comparatively
greater market power in other chains incur less burdensome regulatory
duties as they qualify for treatment under a different vertical model.
In application, vertical modeling imposes government-originated
assumptions about the industrial structure, market power, and reach of ICE
companies. These assumptions become unsustainable when any one ICE
company diversifies and begins to provide services attributable to another
food chain. As well, these assumptions do not work well when any one ICE
venture seamlessly may integrate content creation and content delivery
functions, as occurs when ISPs offer both Internet access—a conduit
function—and Internet-mediated content.
One can appreciate how vertical modeling offers simplicity and
supports the ability to calibrate different regulatory treatment for various
ICE ventures. Governments can subdivide the broad and expansive ICE
industry into specific categories. The broadcasting category covers
networks and individual outlets with some indirect impact on content
creators, syndicators, and packagers. The broadcasting category triggers
media-specific regulatory decision-making that affects spectrum
management, ownership opportunities, public interest obligations, etc.
Despite the expansive nature of such regulation, little attention applies
horizontally, i.e., between broadcasters and other ICE media,32 except when
other media have an impact on the vertical broadcast chain. Accordingly,
the broadcasting regulatory model has limited impact on the cable
content lacked the precision that the First Amendment requires for content regulation). But
see John F. McGuire, Note, When Speech is Heard Around the World: Internet Content
Regulation in the United States and Germany, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 750, 758-59 (1999) (citing
Dawn L. Johnson, Comment, It’s 1996: Do You Know Where Your Cyberkids Are? Captive
Audiences and Content Regulation on the Internet, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO L.
51, 79-85 (1996)); Sarah B. Hogan, Note, To Net or Not to Net: Singapore’s Regulation of
the Internet, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 429, 432 (1999).
32. Indeed, recent court cases have reversed FCC regulations limiting the scope of
horizontal cross-ownership opportunities between media and market-share limitations. See,
e.g., Fox TV Stations v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (vacating the cable-broadcast
cross-ownership rule and remanding to the FCC justifications for national television
ownership caps); Sinclair Brdcst. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(remanding to the FCC the duty to justify ownership limits on local broadcast stations).
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television model, except when horizontal interaction or integration occurs
between the two that has a potential adverse impact on the vertical
regulation of either industry. For example, the FCC imposes “must-carry”
obligations on cable television operators, primarily to ensure the continuing
viability of over-the-air broadcast television.33 Must-carry requirements
help sustain FCC assumptions about broadcasting, including its public
interest value vis-à-vis other media—one of the key rationales for erecting
a specific broadcasting vertical model in the first place. In other words,
assumptions the FCC first made about broadcasting when it erected a
specific vertical model become self-sustaining despite changed marketplace
and technological circumstances. The Commission resists the duty to
recalibrate its regulatory requirements of both broadcasting and other
media that affect it unless significant adverse financial impacts occur. In
the must-carry example, the perceived need to support and sustain “free”
broadcast television supports mandatory carriage of broadcast signals by
cable television operators, despite the fact that more U.S. television viewers
watch television via a cable conduit than via the airwaves.

IV. MARKETPLACE AND TECHNOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE
JEOPARDIZE REGULATORY POLICIES BASED ON SERVICE
DEFINITIONS
As the “goal of telecommunications policy has shifted from the
control of natural monopoly to the promotion of competition,”34 so, too,
must government policymakers recognize the consequences of such a
major paradigm shift in emphasis. This revamped approach triggers new
assumptions about the nature of ICE markets, with at least some of these
assumptions corroborated by empirical evidence, e.g., the appearance of
market entrants even though the sustainability of competition may not yet
be clear.35 The existing or prospective changes, however, typically do not

33. See Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc., 520 U.S. 180.
34. John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Internet Regulation and Consumer Welfare:
Innovation, Speculation, and Cable Bundling, 52 HASTINGS L J. 891, 891 (2001).
35. The FCC has engaged in decision-making based on assumptions about future
marketplace developments. For example, the FCC accepted the premise of some economists
that when a market evidences some potential for becoming competitive, the Commission
should begin the process of deregulating that market, which is now “contestable.”
Contestable markets are characterized by the absence of sunk costs (so that firms
can instantaneously and costlessly enter and exit) and by slower response times by
incumbents relative to entrants (so that entrants can depart before incumbents can
lower price and inflict losses on them). If entry were that easy, then concentration
among incumbents would not affect market performance, nor would it matter if an
incumbent acquired one of many possible entrants into such a market.
John E. Kwoka, Non-Incumbent Competition: Mergers Involving Constraining and
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trigger the formulation of new service definitions, or a departure from
preexisting vertical models. In other words, even if new or more robust
competition develops across vertical models, e.g., telephone versus cable
television companies in the provision of broadband Internet access, the
FCC has applied precompetition and preconvergence definitions with
increasingly anomalous results.
During the transition from monopoly regulation to significantly
deregulated competition, the potential exists for substantial disparity in
regulatory treatment of competitors largely based on how preexisting
service definitions apply. Asymmetry in regulatory treatment may provide
the lesser-regulated venture a competitive advantage based on the ability to
accrue cost savings. “The FCC tolerates regulatory disparity between
competitive providers where necessary to fulfill” legislative or public
policy purposes like those articulated in the Telecommunications Act of
1996 (1996 Act).36
Regulatory agencies, prone to ambiguity, inconsistency, and artificial
tilts in the competitive playing field, cannot sustain regulatory asymmetry
in the face of appellate court scrutiny. The FCC has a rather poor record in
having its decisions affirmed on appeal. Likewise, the FCC’s rationale for
favoring or incubating a particular technology or service classification loses
much intellectual support over time. As new technologies and services gain
market share, the FCC should abandon regulatory handicapping because
failing to do so typically would result in even greater inconsistencies and
anomalous outcomes—slavishly adhering to service classifications that
impose greater regulatory burdens on one category of service provider
having less market share than on a less-regulated category of provider
having more market share.
In its campaign to insulate information services from regulation, the
FCC has created several opportunities for stakeholders to subvert public
policy objectives. For example, ventures able to shoehorn their
telecommunications services into the information services category—no
matter how close to functional equivalence to conventional dial-up
telephony—qualify for exemption from having to pay fees that fund
universal service programs.37 In its effort to eliminate inconsistent
Prospective Competitors, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 173, 189 n.61 (2001). See also WILLIAM
J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
(1982). While some might consider this results-oriented decision-making, others consider
this a way to expedite regulatory change in view of a fast-paced market and technological
developments and the potential for lags in regulatory responses.
36. Robert S. Metzger & Benjamin P. Broderick, Communications Convergence, 18
COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW., Oct. 2001, at 12.
37. Robert M. Frieden, Universal Service: When Technologies Converge and
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regulatory treatment of Internet access providers, the FCC seems intent on
reclassifying a tariffed, retail telecommunications service, e.g., Digital
Subscriber Line (“DSL”) service, as an information service, thereby
establishing regulatory parity with unregulated cable modem services.38

V. VERTICAL REGULATORY MODELS CREATE REGULATORY
ARBITRAGE AND BRINKMANSHIP OPPORTUNITIES
Traditional vertical regulatory regimes have become increasingly
faulty in a convergent environment, largely because they use definitions
that establish mutually exclusive categories and a substantial dichotomy of
regulatory burdens. ICE service providers have become quite adept at
manipulating this regulatory system with an eye toward accruing cost
savings by qualifying for less-burdensome regulatory requirements.
Additionally, stakeholders use litigation to delay or thwart change. While
they may oppose the requirement to form separate subsidiaries when doing
so reduces synergies and adds costs, stakeholders will resort to structural
separation if sufficient financial and operational benefits accrue.
Vertical regulatory models encourage system gaming by stakeholders,
but the creators, implementers, and administrators of these models have to
assume responsibility for creating asymmetrical rights and responsibilities
and the opportunities to migrate to less-burdensome classifications.39 Some
degree of regulatory opportunism will result simply because technologies
evolve and service definitions provide broad, somewhat ambiguous,
snapshots of technology when the terms initially are crafted. But most
examples of regulatory asymmetry result from fundamental flaws in model
creation followed by ad hoc tinkering and retrofits.40

Regulatory Models Diverge, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 395, 431-33 (2000) [hereinafter
Universal Service].
38. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019 (2002).
39. “[A]ll forms of asymmetric regulation contain an intrinsic bias toward some firms
or technologies.” Mark Schankerman, Symmetric Regulation for Competitive
Telecommunications, 8 INFO. ECON. POL’Y 3, 6 (1996).
40. Professor Günter Knieps asserts:
There is a wide range of possible asymmetric regulation. Whereas, in the past,
legal entry barriers protected monopolistic carriers, the regulatory pendulum now
seems to swing in the opposite direction. Asymmetric regulation in favor of
newcomers is motivated by the conviction that, even after the abolishment of the
legal monopoly, the incumbent carrier would still possess a factual monopoly
position on the network infrastructure and the normal voice telephone service.
Therefore, initial support of newcomers, at least for a sufficient transition period,
has been recommended recently in the national regulatory debates . . . .
Prof. Dr. Günter Knieps, Deregulation in Contestable and Non-Contestable Markets, 23
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 90, 99 (2000) (citation omitted).
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VI. EXAMPLES OF HOW DEFINITION-DRIVEN VERTICAL
REGULATION FAILS
Technological and marketplace convergence have created a real or
perceived need by ICE ventures to avoid the common carrier classification
and by the Congress and the FCC to liberalize requirements for those
operators retaining this status. Vertical regulatory modeling tightly links
common carriage with telecommunications service. Until regulatory
flexibility was established in the 1996 Act,41 all telecommunications
service providers incurred the full range of common carrier responsibilities,
specified in Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended,42
including the duty to file cost-based tariffs, to interconnect with other
carriers, and to provide service to all qualified consumers on a
nondiscriminatory basis. In response to increasing competition from
ventures that were able to avoid common carriage responsibilities by
offering services that could fit in the unregulated enhanced service or
information services category, both Congress43 and the FCC44 sought to
reduce the scope and burdens of the common carrier classification. In doing
so, the government eliminated what had been “bright line,” mutually
exclusive categories, a sine qua non of vertical regulation.
Service definitions have become even less effective, because
increasingly no one can easily and unambiguously determine into which
category and vertical regulatory slot a particular service or function fits:
The existing regulatory framework was built around the concept that
different services were provided by different providers, without
overlap. Thus, telephone companies providing telephone service are
41. 47 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2000).
42. Id. § 201.
43. The FCC may forbear from applying any regulation or any provision of the
Communications Act of 1934 if “enforcement of such regulation or provision is not
necessary to ensure that the charges, practices, classifications, or regulations . . . are just and
reasonable and are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory,” enforcement is not
necessary to protect consumers, and “forbearance . . . is consistent with the public interest.”
Id. § 160(a).
44. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019 (2002) [hereinafter Wireline
Broadband NPRM].
First and foremost, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 introduced a mandate
that the Commission promote competition, deregulation and innovation wherever
possible in the communications market. The Act clearly evidences Congress’
intent to involve as many potential providers as possible to bring consumers the
benefits of newer, better and more cost-effective products and services.
Id. para. 35. See, e.g., Review of Reg. Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband
Telecomms. Servs., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 22745 (2001) [hereinafter
ILEC Broadband Notice]; Review of Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent
Local Exchange Carriers, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 22781 (2001).
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regulated as common carriers under Title II of the Communications
Act of 1934 . . . . But, to the extent that [other] wireline networks can
deliver the same services to the consumer at the same quality, it is
difficult to understand why different technologies should trigger
different regulatory treatment for the same services.45

Simply put, a “regulatory model based on who provides the services
is no longer an appropriate model in the [convergent] broadband world.”46
In reducing the scope and reach of common carriage, as well as the stillapplicable requirements, Congress and the FCC largely eliminated the
vertical link between a service definition and the applicable regulatory
model. Traditional common carriers continued to provide
telecommunications services, but other private carriers could provide
functionally equivalent telecommunication services without the common
carrier classification. In other words, creative marketing and lawyering
created opportunities, first, for private carriers to offer what common
carriers previously had offered exclusively and, second, for incumbent
common carriers to present a compelling argument for further relaxation of
common carrier burdens.
One might conclude that increased competition among ventures,
regardless of regulatory classification, would solve any short-term problem
in definition creation and application. Short-term problems have persisted,
however, and have immediate and chronically adverse impact on the
viability and robustness of competition.47 They also have led to arguments
that regulatory asymmetry has resulted in confiscation of private
resources,48 created disincentives for infrastructure investment,49 and tilted

45. Apps & Dailey, supra note 18, at 682-83.
46. Id. at 683.
47. Many authors consider the 1996 Act as having failed to achieve the objectives
articulated in the law. See Adler, supra note 1; Glover & Epps, supra note 1; Michael T.
Osborne, Comment, The Unfinished Business of Breaking Up “Ma Bell:” Implementing
Local Telephone Competition in the Twenty-First Century, 7 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 4 (2000), at
http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v7i/note1.html.
48. See, e.g., Texas Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1999)
(stating that an ILEC failed to show that an FCC decision promoting local exchange service
competition without first implementing a new universal service support system resulted in a
regulatory taking, because the carrier did not prove any loss of revenue).
49. See Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to the
Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks, 109 YALE L.J. 417, 425 (1999);
accord U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (granting petitions for
review, and remanding to the FCC its order requiring ILECs to share local loop lines and to
unbundle service elements in view of the Commission’s failure to consider incipient cable
and satellite competition as well as its decision to establish a national policy that does not
consider local competitive conditions). “Each unbundling of an element imposes costs of its
own, spreading the disincentive to invest in innovation and creating complex issues of
managing shared facilities.” Id. at 427.
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the competitive playing field in favor of one ICE category to the detriment
of others. Common carriage no longer provides a vertical link between
what a venture provides and how government will treat it.

VII. CONFUSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRANSPORT
ANCILLARY TO AN INFORMATION SERVICE WITH COMMON
CARRIAGE TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES
Marketplace and technological convergence already have triggered
the combination of telecommunications and information services, an
outcome that subverts the mutual exclusivity established by separate
vertical regulatory models.50 Such integrated services eliminate the
designation of a single, universally accepted service designation; and can
result in confusion over which classification should apply, and whether for
regulatory purposes, a decoupling of telecommunications and information
services can occur. In turn, this confusion stimulates litigation to
reestablish regulatory certainty, transparency, and fairness. This cycle has
occurred on several occasions recently and, with each instance, the need for
structural reform becomes more pressing.

VIII. INTERNET ACCESS
Internet and broadband services provide a key example of the
regulatory quagmire vertical modeling has generated. Currently, both the
FCC and reviewing courts have struggled with the need to apply
legislatively crafted definitions while limiting regulatory asymmetries.51

50. “Basic service, or ‘pure transmission over a communications path,’ eventually
became ‘telecommunications service’ under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. This
category cannot overlap with the definition of ‘information service.’” Jim Chen, The
Authority to Regulate Broadband Internet Access over Cable, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 677,
708 (2001) (citations omitted).
51. The 1996 Act, which amended the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151
(2000), provides the definitions of cable service, information service, and
telecommunications service. “Cable service” is defined in 47 U.S.C. § 522(6): “(A) the oneway transmission to subscribers of (i) video programming, or (ii) other programming
service, and (B) subscriber interaction, if any, which is required for the selection or use of
such video programming or other programming service.” “Cable system” is defined as:
a facility, consisting of a set of closed transmission paths and associated signal
generation, reception, and control equipment that is designed to provide cable
service which includes video programming and which is provided to multiple
subscribers within a community, but such terms do not include (A) a facility that
serves only to retransmit the television signals of the 1 or more television or
broadcast stations; (B) a facility that serves subscribers without using any public
right-of-way; (C) a facility of a common carrier which is subject, in whole or in
part, to the provisions of title II of this Act, 47 USCS §§ 201 et seq., except that
such facility shall be considered a cable system (other than for purposes of section
621(c)) 47 USCS § 541(c) to the extent such facility is used in the transmission of
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The Commission currently deems telephone company-provided broadband
access a telecommunications service, but it has strongly indicated the desire
to convert the classification of these offerings into the information services
category.52 Such a flip in vertical food chains evidences how inflexible and
unworkable the definitions have become, particularly because a competing
technology—cable modem access—already qualifies for the unregulated
information service classification.53 However, the manner in which the
Commission seeks to establish regulatory parity comes across as
disingenuous. The Commission proposes to downgrade and subordinate the
previously regulated, stand-alone telecommunications component so that it
now qualifies as a minor fused component of an information service.
Should the FCC formalize its proposal, it will have established a
mechanism for deregulating services without having to demonstrate that a
competitive marketplace exists. Likewise, the Commission may find that it
might not have a way to limit stakeholders from shoehorning core, basic
regulated services into an unregulated safe harbor. For example, a
traditionally regulated telecommunications common carrier might try to
seek to characterize its basic telephone services as ancillary, subordinate,
and otherwise fused to its Internet access and other information service
offerings.
The telecommunications/information service definition dichotomy
coupled with the vertical nature of regulation also fails when applied to
Internet access and Internet-mediated services such as packet-switched
telephony. From a top-down approach, telephone companies need not
always provide common carrier telecommunications services, nor must

video programming directly to subscribers unless the extent of such use is solely
to provide interactive on-demand services; (D) an open video system that
complies with section 653 of this title 47 USCS § 573 or (E) any facilities of any
electric utility used solely for operating its electric utility systems.
Id. § 522(7). “Information service” means “the offering of a capability for generating,
acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available
information via telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not
include any use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a
telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications service.” Id.
§ 153(20). “Telecommunications” means “the transmission, between or among points
specified by the user, of information of the user’s choosing, without change in the form or
content of the information as sent and received.” Id. § 153(43). “Telecommunications
service” means “the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to
such classes of users as to be effectively available directly to the public, regardless of the
facilities used.” Id. § 153(46).
52. Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra note 44.
53. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other
Facilities, Internet over Cable Declaratory Ruling, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798 (2002) [hereinafter Cable Modem NPRM].
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cable television companies always provide cable services. Technological
convergence means that current (dial-up telephone service), retrofitted
(DSL),54 or future (broadband fiber-optic cable), telephone company
platforms can transcend many different service categories. Likewise,
retrofitted and future platforms for delivering broadband services can span
several different service categories. Cable television operators that partially
or completely replace coaxial cables with fiber-optic facilities can couple
the customary delivery of video programming with access to a variety of
new data, Internet and telephone services.
Even now, reviewing courts have reached different conclusions as to
what services particular ICE companies may offer. Because the vertical
regulatory model applies a regulatory regime based on specific service
definitions, different courts have inconsistently interpreted definitions
contained in controlling laws and have reached different conclusions as to
the scope and nature of the regulations.

IX. CABLE INTERNET ACCESS
Several courts have confronted the issue of whether cable television
operators must provide access to multiple ISPs instead of exclusive access
to a single owned or affiliated ISP. In addressing the issue whether a state
or municipal government can impose such a common carrier requirement,
courts have struggled to determine which service definition applies to cable
television company-delivered Internet access and, in turn, which regulatory
model applies. Different courts have arrived at different conclusions, a
confusing but predictable outcome when courts examine convergent
technologies, but have to apply mutually exclusive service definitions.
In the span of a few months, three courts came to three different
conclusions regarding the scope of Internet access responsibilities that a
county or municipal government lawfully can impose on a cable television
operator. A federal District Court in Oregon determined that cable
broadband Internet access fit within the “cable service” definition
contained in the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and that
municipal franchising authority properly addressed the issue of how

54. Bell Atl. Tel. Cos., Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 18911 (1998).
Bell Atlantic describes its digital subscriber line (“DSL”) offering as an interstate
data special access service that provides a high speed access connection between
an end user subscriber and an Internet Service Provider (ISP) by utilizing a
combination of the subscriber’s existing local exchange physical plant (i.e. copper
facility), a specialized DSL-equipped wire center, and transport to the
Asynchronous Transfer Mode Cell Relay Service where the ISP will connect to
Bell Atlantic’s network.
Id. para. 1.
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franchisees must open their networks for broadband Internet access.55 The
appellate court rejected this determination, instead applying the
telecommunications service definition and holding that the
Communications Act of 1934 forecloses municipalities from having the
jurisdiction to require cable operators to provide telecommunications
services.56 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the content
delivery function, integral to the provision of broadband Internet access,
constituted a telecommunications service, because the characteristics of
Internet access cannot fit the video- and content-predominant
characteristics specified in the cable services definition. This court
recognized the potential for its holding to trigger the imposition of
complete or streamlined telecommunications common carrier regulation.
The court also held, however, that the FCC had exclusive jurisdiction to
determine whether and how to regulate such telecommunications
services,57 perhaps inferring and endorsing the Commission’s
comparatively greater reluctance to extend telecommunications “legacy
regulation”58 to operators using telecommunications capabilities for the
delivery of information services.59
55. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (D. Or. 1999), rev’d, 216
F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000).
56. AT&T Corp., 216 F.3d 871.
57. Id.
Thus far, the FCC has not subjected cable broadband to any regulation, including
common carrier telecommunications regulation. We note that the FCC has broad
authority to forbear from enforcing the telecommunications provisions if it
determines that such action is unnecessary to prevent discrimination and protect
consumers, and is consistent with the public interest.
Id. at 879.
58. “Given our attempts to reduce the regulatory burden on ILECs, we are especially
reluctant to impose similar legacy regulation on new competitive carriers.” Access Charge
Reform, Seventh Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16
F.C.C.R. 9923, para. 41 (2001). “But as we have found elsewhere with our regulatory
framework, our legacy regulations for equipment approval may impede rather than facilitate
innovation.” Authorization and Use of Software Defined Radios, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R. 24442, 24446 (Separate Statement of Comm’r Susan Ness).
New technologies, while perhaps similar in appearance or in functionality, should
not be stuffed into what may be ill-fitting regulatory categories in the name of
regulation. Rather, the Commission should continue the approach of studying new
technologies and only stepping in where the purpose for which the Commission
was created, protecting the public interest, demands it.
JASON OXMAN, THE FCC AND THE UNREGULATION OF THE INTERNET 24-25 (FCC Office of
Plans and Policy, Working Paper No. 31, (1999)) at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/
OPP/working_papers/oppwp31.pdf.
59. “Furthermore, FCC regulation of ILECs and their DSL broadband transport services
does not affect cable broadband transport services because the FCC has refused to suggest
that the common carrier regulations that apply to telephone companies would apply to cable
broadband Internet access.” Aaron M. Wigod, The AOL-Time Warner Merger: An Analysis
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Another federal court came up with yet a different determination on
which definition and regulatory model should apply. In MediaOne Group,
Inc. v. County of Henrico,60 the federal District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia invalidated an open-access ordinance as violating
Section 541(b)(3)(D) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, that
prohibits franchising authorities from requiring a cable operator to provide
any telecommunications service or facilities other than institutional
networks. The court reasoned that a cable television operator could itself
provide a cable service that blended telecommunications and information
services.
It also held, however, that should a state government agency attempt
to require cable operators to provide just the telecommunications capability
for accessing unaffiliated ISPs, the state agency would be impermissibly
imposing common carrier telecommunications service responsibilities.61
This court emphasized substantive, rather than jurisdictional, grounds for
prohibiting state government regulation. Regardless of whether a cable
operator could unbundle or decouple telecommunications transmission
functions from a cable or information service, the court reasoned that a
state government agency could not lawfully compel a cable television
operator to provide a telecommunications service or a particular
transmission technology—two burdens properly borne solely by common
carriers. Accordingly, this court considered cable television operatordelivered broadband access a cable service, even though it acknowledged
that components or layers of the composite service constituted
telecommunications services.62 While the lower federal court in Portland
emphasized the power of local governments to impose obligations as part
of the franchising process, the MediaOne court pointed to several
limitations on what requirements a franchising authority could impose.63
of the Broadband Internet Access Market, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 349, 362 (2002).
See Cable Modem NPRM, supra note 53.
60. 97 F. Supp. 2d 712, 714 (E.D. Va. 2000), aff’d, 257 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 2001).
61. “None of the specific grants of regulatory power authorizes a locality to require that
the franchise holder give other ISPs the right to use its cable modem platform. Nor can such
power be necessarily implied from the express language or deemed essential and
indispensable to the County’s purposes.” Id. at 717.
62. “The County is therefore requiring MediaOne to provide a telecommunications
facility as a condition for the approval of the transfer of control, and accordingly, the
Ordinance is in violation of Section 541(c)(3)(D).” Id. at 714.
63. MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 257 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 2001).
Henrico County’s open access provision violates the federal Communications Act,
47 U.S.C. § 541(b)(3)(D), by forcing MediaOne to provide its telecommunication
facilities (its cable modem platform) to any ISP as a condition for the County’s
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These three cases depict significant confusion in determining the
length and breadth of what constitutes a telecommunications service,
particularly when coupled with either a cable service or an information
service. In some instances, the differences in what a venture offers do not
matter. For example, the Supreme Court recently opted not to differentiate
cable services from other services available via a single conduit for the
purpose of qualifying the cable television operator to access telephone pole
space and to install the cable necessary to deliver any type of ICE service
to consumers.64 But in many other instances, the application of service
definition directly impacts the range of regulation and scope of jurisdiction
by federal, state, and municipal agencies, e.g., common carrier
telecommunications services versus private carrier information services.

X. THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION TRIES TO
BECOME TECHNOLOGY AGNOSTIC, BY DIFFERENTIATING
TELECOMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES FROM SERVICES
For its part, the FCC has expressed a strong disinclination to subject
the telecommunications service function to regulation when it becomes
integrated with and delivers broadband services, regardless of who
provides this function. In two separate proceedings, the FCC has sought to
diminish the importance of the telecommunications services component, as
a separate and regulated element of a convergent information service
regardless of whether a historically regulated common carrier telephone
company provides the telecommunications capability65 or whether a cable
television firm does.66
The Commission’s unstated rationale for this outcome lies in its goal
of reducing regulatory asymmetry between broadband services provided by
ventures heretofore regulated as telecommunications service providers, i.e.,
common carriers, and ventures heretofore unregulated or subject to less
burdensome regulations as providers of cable or information services. Put
more bluntly, the FCC clearly seeks to eliminate the application of

approval of the transfer of control of the franchise. Because the open access
provision is inconsistent with the federal Communications Act, it is preempted
and superceded.
Id. at 359.
64. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327 (2002)
(stating that cable television operators have a lawful right to attach their facilities to poles
installed and maintained by unaffiliated public utilities regardless of whether the
attachments are used solely to provide cable television services, or high-speed Internet
access).
65. Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra note 44, para. 4.
66. Cable Modem NPRM, supra note 53, para. 6.
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longstanding common carrier regulatory burdens on telephone companies
when they bundle or blend broadband telecommunications services with
information services. The Commission proposes to do this by deeming any
broadband Internet access service, carried by either cable television
systems67 or incumbent local exchange carriers, an information service.68
The FCC believes the identical designation for services transmitted
via different technological architectures represents a functional approach
that supports ubiquitous deployment of advanced services, harmonized
regulation of multiple technical platforms, minimum necessary regulation,
and a consistent analytical framework.69
The FCC claims it has adopted a “functional approach, focusing on
the nature of the service provided to consumers, rather than one that
focuses on the technical attributes of the underlying architecture.”70 The
FCC also acknowledges that attributing the same service classification to
different technologies “may not lead to identical regulatory models across
platforms. . . . [in view of] legal, market, or technological distinctions [that]
may require different regulatory requirements between platforms, or
between certain types of providers of one particular platform.”71
Accordingly, the Commission has not established a single regulatory model
for information services, but instead has at least two parallel vertical tracks:
information services mediated via cable television systems, and
information services mediated via local exchange carriers. To achieve this
partial harmonization of regulatory treatment, the Commission has to
subordinate the telecommunications transport function relative to the
information services provided and dismiss the previously recognized legal,
marketplace, and technological differences between the two carriers.

XI. SUBORDINATING AND DIFFERENTIATING
TELECOMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES AND SERVICES
The FCC justifies its information services designation of cable and
telephone company-provided Internet access by first noting that it has to

67. “[W]e conclude that cable modem service, as it is currently offered, is properly
classified as an interstate information service, not as a cable service, and that there is no
separate offering of telecommunications service.” Id. para. 7.
68. “Because wireline broadband Internet access services fuse communications power
with powerful computer capabilities and content, these services appear to fall within the
class of services that the Commission has traditionally identified as ‘information services,’
which blend communications with computer processing.” Wireline Broadband NPRM,
supra note 44, para. 13.
69. Id. paras. 3-6.
70. Id. para. 7.
71. Id.
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make an either/or decision. The Commission made this assertion in a 1998
report to Congress responding to queries about the status of services, such
as Internet-mediated long-distance telephone services, that have qualified
for information services regulatory exemptions, but increasingly provide a
competitive alternative to regulated telecommunications services.72 While
acknowledging that “hybrid” service may exist, the Commission
nevertheless insisted that “the categories of ‘telecommunications service’
and information service [as defined] in the 1996 Act are mutually
exclusive.”73
Having decided to apply the information services classification, the
FCC then had to find a way to dismiss as insignificant the fact that a
telecommunications link delivered information services to various users.
The FCC achieved this outcome by holding that the telecommunications
linkage function did not have a separate and identifiable existence, even
though previously wireline carriers tariffed this service as retail
telecommunications. If the FCC can glibly reclassify and subordinate
telecommunications functionality when coupled with an information
service, might the Commission allow traditionally regulated common
carriers the opportunity to offer basic telecommunications services on an
unregulated basis if coupled with information services, e.g., ancillary voice
telephony, as part of an unregulated suite of information services?
To maintain mutual exclusivity between telecommunications services
and information services, the Commission needed to differentiate between
telecommunications as an integral part in providing a service, and
telecommunications as a capability or building block: “[W]e tentatively
conclude that the transmission component of retail wireline broadband
Internet access service provided over an entity’s own facilities is
‘telecommunications’ and not a ‘telecommunications service.’”74 It appears
that when providing Internet services mediated via existing plants
otherwise available to provide retail telecommunications services, a local
exchange carrier no longer operates as a telecommunications service
provider. Instead, it provides to consumers the opportunity to “use”
telecommunications as the building block for information services: “When

72. Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Report to Congress, 13 F.C.C.R. 11501,
11 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1312 (1998) [hereinafter Report to Congress]; see also
Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of the Comms.
Act of 1934, as amended, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 21905, 5 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 696 (1996); Universal Service,
supra note 37; Robert M. Frieden, Dialing for Dollars: Will the FCC Regulate Internet
Telephony?, 23 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH. L.J. 47 (1997).
73. Report to Congress, supra note 72, para. 39.
74. Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra note 44, para. 17.
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an entity offers subscribers the ‘capability for generating, acquiring,
storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing or making available
information
via
telecommunications,’
it
does
not
provide
75
telecommunications; it is using telecommunications.”
The FCC now proposes to subdivide what was once identified as a
telecommunications service into two telecommunications subsets: (1)
telecommunications subordinate to, and the building block for, the delivery
of an information service; and (2) telecommunications integral to the
delivery of a telecommunications service to end users. The transition from
category one to two results when the telecommunications functionality
draws a fee directly from the public.76

XII. EQUATING INTERNET ACCESS VIA CABLE TELEVISION AND
LOCAL EXCHANGE FACILITIES
Should the Commission persist in creating this new deregulatory
regime, it could consider telephone company broadband services, such as
Digital Subscriber Lines, as equally entitled to the largely unregulated
status available to cable modem broadband services.
On its face, the FCC’s deregulatory initiative appears compelling as it
reduces asymmetrical regulation and places two deep-pocketed ventures on
a level competitive playing field. Some analysts have asserted that cable
television operators have enjoyed an unfair competitive advantage in
having qualified for the information services—an unregulated “safe
harbor” that prevents federal, state, or municipal regulators from imposing
open access and other possibly costly common carrier obligations.77 But in
75. Report to Congress, supra note 72, para. 41. This report was mandated by the
Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, 111 Stat. 2440, 2521-2522, § 623,
referring to 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) as defining various relevant terms.
76. Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra note 44.
[W]e tentatively conclude that providers of wireline broadband Internet access
service that provision the service over their own facilities do not offer
‘telecommunications for a fee directly to the public.’ Indeed, it seems as if a
provider offering the service over its own facilities does not offer
‘telecommunications’ to anyone, it merely uses telecommunications to provide
end-users with wireline broadband Internet access services, which . . . we believe
is an information service. Therefore, we tentatively conclude that in the case
where an entity combines transmission over its own facilities with its offering of
wireline Internet access service, the classification of that input is
telecommunications, and not a telecommunications service.
Id. para. 25.
77. See Wigod, supra note 59.
The merger [of America Online with Time Warner] unites the second largest cable
broadband transport service with the largest narrowband ISP in the world. In the
AOL-Time Warner cable divisions, AOL-Time Warner will attempt to migrate
AOL’s twenty-three million narrowband subscribers to cable broadband offered
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its chosen deregulatory quest, the FCC has engaged in a flawed and
disingenuous strategy to combine previously different regulatory models
based on new functional similarity. Suddenly a telecommunications service
can become stripped of its common carrier regulatory triggers if and when
the FCC chooses to emphasize the content or enhancements carried via the
telecommunications conduit.
A far better and more straightforward approach would emphasize the
substantial flexibility granted to the FCC by the 1996 Act to free
telecommunications services providers of nearly all traditional common
carrier regulatory responsibilities if circumstances and the public interest
support such deregulation. This model provides for true technology
agnosticism without the likely adverse and unanticipated outcomes of the
Commission’s proposed strategy.

XIII. AN INABILITY OR REFUSAL TO HARMONIZE DIVERGENT
REGULATORY MODELS
The vertical regulatory regime established by law and implemented
by the FCC requires an either/or determination.78 Only by ignoring or
rationalizing the telecommunications service functionality as a subelement
of a composite broadband service can the FCC transfer Internet access to
the information services classification and thereby qualify for top-down
unregulated status. The Commission relegates the telecommunications
service aspect of broadband access to a subordinate role not worth
triggering regulation by differentiating between a telecommunications
by AOL-Time Warner. Similarly, Time Warner will migrate its cable television
subscribers from narrowband to the cable broadband AOL-Time Warner is
offering. Additionally, AOL-Time Warner will migrate nonaffiliated ISPs’
subscribers from narrowband to cable broadband in the AOL-Time Warner cable
divisions. [Having the right to] [d]eny[] access or discriminating against
nonaffiliated ISPs who seek to offer competitive cable broadband Internet access
to consumers furthers these objectives and ensures the success of AOL-Time
Warner in the broadband Internet access market.
Id. at 364; Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001); Mark
Cooper, Open Access to the Broadband Internet: Technical and Economic Discrimination in
Closed, Proprietary Networks, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011 (2000); Harold Feld, Whose Line
Is It Anyway? The First Amendment and Cable Open Access, 8 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 23
(2000). Other authors consider mandated access unnecessary. See James B. Speta,
Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open Access Rules for Broadband
Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39 (2000).
78. “The FCC believed that not treating telecommunications and information services
as mutually exclusive would lead to the conclusion that all such services were
telecommunications services. (It was right.)” Steve Kelley, Liberating our Digital Future:
How the 1996 Telecommunications Act Definitions are Hobbling Change, 27 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 2137, 2150 (2001) (citation omitted).
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service delivered to end users and a telecommunications “capability” used
to deliver the predominating information service that, of course, is also
provided to end users.79 In the Commission’s new strategy for deregulating
Internet access regardless of provider, traditionally regulated
telecommunications services can lose their standalone status and become
packaged with and subsumed in an information service.80
Rather than narrow a regulatory loophole, the FCC has created an
incredibly larger one. The Commission’s Wireline Broadband Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking81 and efforts to promote user access to advanced
telecommunications82 appear to offer telecommunications service providers
the ability to free themselves of any and all common carrier burdens that
otherwise would apply to broadband telecommunications service simply by
characterizing these offerings as information services. For example, ILECs
could characterize their DSL broadband Internet service as an information
service, despite the Commission’s previous determination that enhanced
retail copper wire local loops provide telecommunications services.83 As

79. Even though “wireline broadband Internet access services fuse communications
power with powerful computer capabilities and content,” the Commission concluded that
the composite service constitutes an information service. Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra
note 44, para. 13.
80. The Commission tentatively concluded that “the transmission component of retail
wireline broadband Internet access service provided over an entity’s own facilities [which
typically are also used to provide telecommunications services] is ‘telecommunications’ and
not a ‘telecommunications service.’” Id. para. 17.
81. See generally id.
82. Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecomms. Capability to All
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, First Report, 14 F.C.C.R. 2398, 14 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 1292 (1999); Second Report, 15 F.C.C.R. 20913, 22 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 390
(2000); Third Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 2844 (2002).
83. Section 251(c)(4) imposes on ILECs the duty to offer for resale at wholesale rates
“any telecommunications service that the carrier provides at retail to subscribers who are not
telecommunications carriers.” 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4)(A) (2000). The Commission has
concluded that DSL services offered on a retail basis to end users are subject to the
requirement of Section 251(c)(4) and therefore these services constitute telecommunication
services.
[B]ased on our examination of the statutory language, the Act’s purpose, and the
specific facts before us, we conclude that advanced services sold to residential and
business end-users are subject to the section 251(c)(4) discounted resale
obligation, without regard to their classification as telephone exchange service or
exchange access service.
Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, Second Report
and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 19237, para. 8, 18 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 407 (1999). However, the
Commission has expressly refused to decide whether DSL service not provided on a retail
basis to end users fits within the telecommunications services category.
The Commission has not addressed the situation where an incumbent LEC does
not offer DSL transport at retail, but instead offers only an Internet access
service. . . . Accordingly, because Commission precedent does not address the
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DSL technology has the capability of providing both Internet broadband
services and conventional voice telephony over the same wire, the
Commission’s all-or-nothing thinking probably would permit ILECs to
bundle “associated and ancillary voice services” with the predominant
broadband Internet access information service, thereby qualifying both
types of services for the unregulated information services classification.84
To add to the regulatory quagmire, any transfer of telecommunications
service into the information service classification would reduce the source
of funding for universal services that is limited by law to providers of
telecommunications services.85
The FCC appropriately has expressed reservations about extending
preexisting “legacy” regulations to Internet access and Internet-mediated

specific facts or legal issues raised here, we decline to reach a conclusion in the
context of this section 271 proceeding.
Joint Application by SBC Comms. Inc., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., and Southwestern Bell
Comms. Servs., Inc. d/b/a Southwestern Bell Long Distance Pursuant to Section 271 of the
Telecomms. Act of 1996 to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Servs. in Ark. and Mo.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 20719, para. 82, 25 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
183 (2001).
84. “Because wireline broadband Internet access services fuse [tele]communications
power with powerful computer capabilities and content, these services appear to fall within
the class of services that the Commission has traditionally identified as ‘information
services,’ which blend [tele]communications with computer processing.” Wireline
Broadband NPRM, supra note 44, para. 13. This rationale might support the decision not to
regulate an Internet access provider when it leases dial-up telephone and DSL
telecommunications lines in the provision of its information services and Internet access. It
ignores, however, the fact that heretofore both carriers and consumers have decoupled the
telecommunications and information-processing aspects of Internet access. When
consumers install a modem and use dial-up telephone lines for Internet access, the telephone
line remains available for voice communications and no permanent fusion has occurred.
Similarly, the fact that DSL conditions basic copper loops and expands their bandwidth does
not eliminate the telecommunications capabilities of the loop through fusion with its Internet
access capabilities.
85. Two FCC Commissioners considered the consequences of such an outcome.
Commissioner Copps stated that the Commission should not unilaterally “remove . . .
[wireline broadband] services from the numerous competition, universal service, and
consumer protection provisions that Congress imposed on common carriers providing
telecommunications services.” Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra note 44, at 3072, 3073
(Separate Statement of Comm’r Michael J. Copps, dissenting in part, concurring in part).
Commissioner Kevin Martin noted that the Commission left open the possibility of
offsetting universal service funding shortfalls resulting from expanding the set of
information services, by expanding the set of mandatory contributors to include nonwireline
broadband Internet access providers, such as wireless, cable, and satellite providers. Id. at
3074-76 (Separate Statement of Comm’r Kevin J. Martin). For an assessment of the
consequences resulting from the lack of competitive neutrality insofar as universal service
funding requirements, see Universal Service, supra note 37, at 433.
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services.86 To do so would broaden the range of common carrier
telecommunications regulation at a time when the Commission wants
simultaneously to incubate new technologies by refraining from imposing
stifling regulatory burdens and to free incumbents of similar burdens. This
well-intentioned reticence to extend regulation, however, forces the FCC to
come up with clever but unsustainable equivocations, such as ad hoc,
hybrid categories,87 to avoid answering difficult questions regarding the
future reach of regulation. Much of this ad hoc rethinking of how
definitions apply stems from the vertical regulatory models the
Commission has erected and seeks to maintain. While new technologies do
force regulatory agencies to determine into which categories innovative
new services fit, the predominant trigger for trouble lies in the
Commission’s perceived need to make all or nothing assignments, i.e.,
mutually exclusive, self-contained classifications of telecommunications
versus information services.
At least one court has refused to endorse identifying the Internet as a
single preexisting regulatory classification such as information service. In
Gulf Power Co. v. FCC,88 a divided Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the FCC lacked authority to prescribe a formula for calculating the
rates cable television companies should pay public utilities for use of pole
86. Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra note 44.
The Commission will avoid simply extending existing rules that were crafted to
govern legacy services provided over legacy networks. Over many years, several
distinct major networks have been deployed and optimized to provide very
specific services. Legacy regulations were based on technical and market
assumptions concerning these networks and the services they delivered.
Id. para. 6.
87. For example, the Commission has acknowledged the difficulty in completely
segregating telecommunications services from information services, especially when
providers of the latter offer functional equivalents to the former. The Commission expressly
identified types of Internet-mediated telephone service as possibly fitting into either the
telecommunication services or the information services category:
Specifically, when an IP telephony service provider deploys a gateway within the
network to enable phone-to-phone service, it creates a virtual transmission path
between points on the public switched telephone network over a packet-switched
IP network. These providers typically purchase dial-up or dedicated circuits from
carriers and use those circuits to originate or terminate Internet-based calls. From
a functional standpoint, users of these services obtain only voice transmission,
rather than information services such as access to stored files. The provider does
not offer a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing,
retrieving, utilizing, or making available information. Thus, the record currently
before us suggests that this type of IP telephony lacks the characteristics that
would render them ‘information services’ within the meaning of the statute, and
instead bear the characteristics of ‘telecommunications services.’
Report to Congress, supra note 72, para. 89.
88. 208 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Nat’l Cable &
Telecomm. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327 (2002).
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or conduit space when providing broadband Internet access in addition to
cable services. The court held that the FCC had authority to regulate the
rate for cable service and telecommunications, but not for Internet service
that the court considered outside both categories.89
A reversal by the Supreme Court, however, eliminated the
precedential value in this rejection of a telecommunications/information
service dichotomy. The Court reversed and remanded the case based on a
reading of Section 224(b) of the Pole Attachment Act, which broadly
defines pole attachments as including “any attachment by a cable television
system”90 regardless of what services the attachment supports: “The
addition of . . . [an additional] service does not change the character of the
attaching entity—the entity the attachment is ‘by.’”91 The Supreme Court’s
reading of the Pole Attachment Act provides a passing endorsement of the
telecommunications/information service dichotomy, because the Court
affirmed the FCC decision to permit rate-regulated Internet access pole
attachments92 and noted that the Commission “decided that Internet
services [provided by cable television systems] are not telecommunications
services.”93

89. The Pole Attachment Act of 1996, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 224, requires the FCC
to regulate the rates, terms and conditions for pole attachments and specifically mentions
those two types of attachments: 1) those used by a cable television system to provide cable
service and 2) those used by a cable television system to provide a telecommunications
service. The Eleventh Circuit held that Internet service “is neither.” Id. at 1276.
90. 47 U.S.C. § 224(a)(5) (2000).
91. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. at 333.
92. “Again, no rate challenge is before us, but we note that the FCC proceeded in a
sensible fashion.” Id. at 337.
93. Id. (citing Implementation of Section 703(e) of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, Report
and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 6777, paras. 31-34, 11 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 79 (1998)).
Additionally, the Court did not find fault with the Commission’s failure to specify whether
cable system-provided Internet access constitutes a cable service even though the
Commission determined that commingled cable television and Internet access pole
attachments qualified for the cable service rate under Section 224(d)(3) of the Pole
Attachments Act, as opposed to a higher rate for pole attachments provided to providers of
telecommunications services under Section 224(e)(1). The Court, however, did note
stakeholder frustration in the FCC’s refusal to categorize Internet services and by the
Commission’s decision to authorize the cable service pole attachment rate for commingled
services without having decided they constitute cable services: “[D]ecisionmakers
sometimes dodge hard questions when easier ones are dispositive; and we cannot fault the
FCC for taking this approach.” Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. at 338. In a partial dissenting
opinion, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Souter, would have vacated the Court of
Appeals’ judgment and remanded the case to the FCC with a requirement that the
Commission “decide at long last whether high-speed Internet access provided through cable
wires constitutes cable service or telecommunications service or falls into neither category.”
Id. at 347.
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The FCC has applied such all-or-nothing strategies before. In
determining jurisdictional scope, the Commission prefers a
“contamination” theory in lieu of shared jurisdiction. A
telecommunications network with ninety-nine percent intrastate traffic and
one percent interstate traffic could motivate the Commission to establish
exclusive federal jurisdiction.94 Federal preemption of state regulation
presumes a bright-line distinction between jurisdictional reach just as a
telecommunications/information service dichotomy assumes mutual
exclusivity. More recently the 1996 Act has required the FCC to share
jurisdiction with state public utility commissions, and to rely on FederalState Joint Boards with mixed success.95 The FCC may express support for
the concept of shared jurisdiction, but its preference for either/or service
categories and regulatory models proves its baseline regulatory thinking.
Eventually, the FCC must confront and resolve the fact that Internet
access
and
Internet-mediated
services
seamlessly
blend
telecommunications and information services. The Commission has
identified instances where telecommunications is ancillary to an
information service, or a “capability” essential for delivering advanced
services. But rather than adopt a functional analysis without regard to who
provides the service and what regulatory classification they previously
secured, the Commission takes great and unsustainable efforts to make
distinctions between various telecommunication applications with an eye
toward avoiding altogether the application of the telecommunication
services classification.
In its implementation of the 1996 Act’s Section 706, which calls for
FCC promotion of innovation and investment in advanced
telecommunications capabilities,96 the Commission appears intent on
94. “The ‘contamination theory’ contemplates that a service or facility used only
partially for intrastate communication is not subject to Commission jurisdiction.” Dept. of
Defense v. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Northwest, 38 F.C.C.2d 803, para. 8 n.17, 26 Rad. Reg.2d
(P & F) 245 (1973); see also Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Md., Memorandum
Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 2 F.C.C.R. 3528, 63 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 369
(1985), vacated as moot, Order, 3 F.C.C.R. 748 (1988).
95. See, e.g., Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Serv., Twelfth Report and Order,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15
F.C.C.R. 12208, 21 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 210 (2000).
96. “Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act) charges the
Commission with ‘encourag[ing] the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of
advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans’ by ‘regulatory forbearance,
measures that promote competition . . . , or other regulating methods that remove barriers to
infrastructure investment.’” Cable Modem NPRM, supra note 53, para. 4 (alterations in
original). See Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecomms. Capability to
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stripping, of the telecommunications service classification and common
carrier responsibilities, any and all broadband services offering throughout
at speeds in excess of 200 kilobits per second.97 Regardless of the fact that
incumbent telecommunications carriers have heretofore offered many
broadband services as telecommunications services and without much
regard to the degree of present or prospective competition, the Commission
has proposed to eliminate conventional common carrier requirements
specified in Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, in the
Wireline Broadband Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and a related Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking reviewing the regulatory requirements for
ILECs.98 Additionally, the Commission seeks to eliminate much of the
1996 Act-mandated access to unbundled network elements (“UNEs”) based
on the view that it mandates such mandatory access by market entrants
only so long as ILECs maintain bottleneck control and market power over
access to first- and last-mile infrastructure, i.e., the transmission and
switching facilities needed to access end-users.99 Remarkably, FCC
initiatives match or exceed congressional bills that heretofore have failed
passage in both houses of Congress,100 primarily because of concerns that
such wholesale liberalization will enable ILECs to solidify bottleneck
control and market power without having to complete the significant
structural adjustments needed to accommodate competition.101
All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, Notice of Inquiry, 13 F.C.C.R. 15280
(1998) [hereinafter Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications]. See also cases cited
supra note 82.
97. Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications, supra note 96, para. 7.
98. ILEC Broadband Notice, supra note 44.
[W]e request comment on the appropriate regulatory requirements under Title II
of the [Communications] Act for the provision of broadband services by
incumbent LECs given current market conditions. In particular we ask interested
parties to address how the Commission can best balance the goals of encouraging
broadband investment and deployment, fostering competition in the provision of
broadband services, promoting innovation, and eliminating unnecessary
regulation.
Id. para. 7 (examining whether changing market conditions favor deregulation of ILEC
broadband services). “We tentatively conclude that wireline broadband Internet access
services—whether provided over a third party’s facilities or self-provisioned facilities—are
information services subject to [limited] regulation under Title I of the Act” instead of Title
II common carrier regulation. Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra note 44, para. 16.
99. Review of Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange
Carriers, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 22781, para. 1 (2001).
100. See The Internet Freedom and Broadband Deployment Act of 2001, H.R. 1542
107th Cong. (2002) (passed in the House of Representatives Feb. 27, 2002, and received in
the Senate and read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation Feb. 28, 2002). Legislative history available at http://thomas.loc.gov/.
101. See, e.g., Robert E. Hall & William H. Lehr, Promoting Broadband Investment and
Avoiding Monopoly, Sand Hill Econometrics, at http://www.sandhillecon.com/
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More broadly, the FCC appears keenly interested in establishing a
substantial dichotomy between ILEC regulatory burdens and
responsibilities applicable to basic telephony on one hand, and anything
that relates to broadband and information services (including the Internet
access whether by retrofitted copper facilities or new technologies like
fiber optics) on the other hand. The Commission also has expressed an
interest in dismantling some of its key regulatory safeguards established in
the Third Computer Inquiry.102 Specifically, the Commission appears quite
willing to abandon the requirement that providers of both basic and
enhanced telecommunications services, e.g., ILECs, unbundle the basic

hlpaper2/Broadband.PDF (Feb. 21, 2002) (consultants’ study sponsored by AT&T); TauzinDingell is Evil! Eight Reasons Why the Tauzin-Dingell Bill is BAD for America’s Telephone
Customers, TeleTruth, at http://www.teletruth.org/News/tauzinDingell/8reasons.html (last
visited Nov. 29, 2002).
102. See Reg. and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and
Comms. Servs. and Facilities, Final Decision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 21 Rad. Reg.2d
(P & F) 1591 (1971), aff’d in part, modified sub nom. GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d
724 (2d Cir. 1973), decision on remand, 40 F.C.C.2d 293 (1973), 26 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F)
1687 (1973); Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules and Regs. (Second
Computer Inquiry), Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 47 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 699 (1980);
Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules and Regs. (Third Computer
Inquiry), Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958, 60 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 603 (1986)
[hereinafter Computer III Phase I Order], recon., 2 F.C.C.R. 3035, 62 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F)
1584 (1987) [hereinafter Phase I Reconsideration Order], further recon., 3 F.C.C.R. 1135,
64 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 649 (1988), second further recon., 4 F.C.C.R. 5927, 66 Rad Reg.2d
(P & F) 1323 (1989), Computer III Phase I Order and Phase I Reconsideration Order,
supra, vacated by California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter California
I]; Amendment to Sections 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules and Regs. (Third Computer
Inquiry), Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 3072, 62 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1662 (1987)
[hereinafter Phase II Order], recon., 3 F.C.C.R. 1150, 64 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 783 (1988),
further recon., 4 F.C.C.R. 5927, 66 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1323 (1989), Phase II Order
vacated by California I, supra; Computer III Remand Proceedings, Report and Order, 5
F.C.C.R. 7719, 68 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 873 (1990), recon., 7 F.C.C.R. 909, 70 Rad. Reg.2d
(P & F) 394 (1992), pet. for review denied, California v. FCC, 4 F.3d 1505 (9th Cir. 1993);
Computer III Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Safeguards and Tier 1 Local
Exchange Co. Safeguards, Report and Order, 6 F.C.C.R. 7571, 70 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 121
(1991) [hereinafter BOC Safeguards Order], recon. dismissed in part sub nom.
Implementation of the Telecomms. Act of 1996: Telecomms. Carriers’ Use of Customer
Proprietary Network Info. and Other Customer Info., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11
F.C.C.R. 12513, 3 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 2249 (1996), BOC Safeguards Order, vacated in
part and remanded, California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S.
1050 (1995); Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Provision of
Enhanced Servs., Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 6040, 15 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 2017 (1998) [hereinafter Computer III Further Notice]; Computer III Further
Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced Servs., Report and Order,
14 F.C.C.R. 4289, 15 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 149 (1999), recon., 14 F.C.C.R. 21628, 18
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1344 (1999) [hereinafter Computer III Further Order].
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telecommunications transport function and provide that basic service on a
tariffed and standalone basis.103
The Commission cannot achieve the twin goal of sustaining service
classifications and the vertical regulatory regimes while also creating novel
ways to ignore the telecommunication services aspect of a convergent,
blended, and hybrid service that clearly has a horizontal layer of
telecommunications delivered to consumers. Worse yet, continuing the
“effort to segment telecommunications services, cable services and
information services, at least in the way Congress and the FCC have gone
about it, increases the problem of discrimination among providers in
competition with each other and, consequently, could have the effect of
deterring competition.”104

XIV. APPELLATE COURTS FREQUENTLY REJECT THE FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION’S REGULATORY MODELING
The FCC has achieved a rather poor track record with appellate
courts, particularly when the Commission’s policy rationales stretch the
customary judicial deference to agency expertise.105 Such stretching occurs
when the Commission engages in results-oriented decision-making,
regardless of the record created, statutory limitations, or restrictions
imposed by vertical regulatory models. Having created the “safe harbor,” a
largely unregulated information services category, the FCC currently
ignores the current or prospective degree of competition in first- and lastmile access to information services with the clear intention of deregulating
traditionally regulated common carrier telecommunications services. The
1996 Act provides a basis for the Commission to undertake such
deregulation; however, the Commission has not implemented that process
which deregulates common carriers offering telecommunications services if
competition exists and the public interest supports deregulation. Instead,
the Commission pulls telecommunications capabilities out from the
telecommunications service classification, thereby achieving deregulation
without having to undertake the fact-finding and record-generating to
support specific, i.e., section-by-section deregulation as required by Section
103. Computer III Further Notice, supra note 102; Computer III Further Order, supra
note 102 (addressing certain portions of the Computer III Further Notice); see also Further
Comment Requested to Update and Refresh Record on Computer III Requirements, Public
Notice, 16 F.C.C.R. 5363, 5364 (2001) (asking “whether ISPs can obtain, under the ONA
[open network architecture] framework, the telecommunications service inputs that they
require from the BOCs [Bell operating companies], including . . . DSL service”).
104. Kelley, supra note 78, at 2161.
105. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863-65
(1984).
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10 of the 1996 Act. Such a wholesale grand scheme for abandoning Title II
common carrier regulation should not pass muster with reviewing courts.

XV. EXAMPLES OF JUDICIAL REVERSALS
A.

Deregulation that Ignores Statutory Requirements

It took the FCC three trips to an appellate court before the
Commission secured approval of its longstanding desire to free common
carriers of the duty to file and comply with tariffs.106 Prior to receiving
legislative authorization in the 1996 Act to permit the elimination of Title
II common carrier responsibilities, the Commission summarily concluded
that it made sense to do so.107 Appellate courts twice admonished the
Commission that it cannot eliminate requirements imposed by law simply
because the Commission thinks the law should no longer apply.108

B. Playing the Interstate Telecommunications Card to Preempt
State Jurisdiction or Legislative Requirements
The interstate nature of many telecommunications services supports a
single, coordinated federal policy under FCC jurisdiction. The
Commission, however, may use the interstate classification to foreclose

106. In MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia struck down “mandatory detariffing” as inconsistent with the
Communications Act of 1934. 765 F.2d 1186, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See also AT&T Co. v.
FCC, 978 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1992), aff’d sub nom. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co.,
512 U.S. 218 (1994) (the FCC could not suspend, permissively or mandatorily, the tariff
filing obligations for interexchange carriers, whether they had market power or not); see
also MCI WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 209 F.3d 760 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
107. Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servs. and
Facilities Authorizations Therefor, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 77 F.C.C.2d 308
(1979); First Report and Order, 85 F.C.C.2d 1 (1980); Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 84 F.C.C.2d 445 (1981); Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 47
Fed. Reg. 17,308 (1982); Second Report and Order, 91 F.C.C.2d 59 (1982), recon. denied,
93 F.C.C.2d 54 (1983); Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 48 Fed. Reg. 28,292
(1983); Third Report and Order, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,791 (1983); Fourth Report and Order, 95
F.C.C.2d 554 (1983), vacated by AT&T, 978 F.2d 727, cert. denied, MCI Telecomms. Corp.
v. AT&T, 509 U.S. 913 (1993); Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 49 Fed.
Reg. 11,856 (1984); Fifth Report and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1191, 56 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F)
1204 (1984); Sixth Report and Order, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020, 57 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1391
(1985), vacated by MCI Telecomms. Corp., 765 F.2d 1186 (collectively referred to as the
Competitive Carrier proceeding). The FCC’s detariffing object finally passed muster with an
appellate court after enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that provided
conditional authorization to eliminate Title II common carrier responsibilities. See MCI
WorldCom, Inc., 209 F.3d 760.
108. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 765 F.2d 1186; AT&T, 978 F.2d 727, cert. denied, MCI
Telecomms. Corp., 509 U.S. 913.
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state involvement, even for services and policies pertaining to both local,
intrastate, and interstate jurisdictions. For example, Internet access traffic
originating via LEC facilities and handed off to an ISP, or to another LEC
that in turn hands the traffic off to an ISP, was deemed interstate by the
FCC.109 This classification exempts such traffic from the reciprocal
compensation requirement imposed on LECs by Section 251 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended. An appellate court reversed the
FCC and remanded the case to the Commission. On remand, the FCC
reaffirmed its conclusion that traffic delivered to an ISP is interstate, and
the Commission ordered a transition to “bill and keep” cost recovery
whereby both ILECs and ISPs recover costs from their own customers
without the carriers compensating each other.110 On a second appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit remanded, but did not reverse, the
FCC on the narrow grounds that the Commission could not have relied on
Section 251(g) of the 1996 Act to carve out a “bill and keep” zero
compensation arrangement for calls to ISPs.111 That section did not provide
the basis for a substantive change in policy as it only authorized the FCC to
maintain LEC regulatory duties that predated enactment of the 1996 Act in
the transition to the new requirements established by the 1996 Act.

109. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomms. Act of
1996, Declaratory Ruling in CC Docket No. 96-98 and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in
CC Docket No. 99-68, 14 F.C.C.R. 3689, para. 1, 15 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 201 (1999),
vacated sub nom. Bell Atlantic v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (FCC ordered to
explain why LEC termination of ISP calls are not local in nature); Implementation of the
Local Compensation Provisions in the Telecomms. Act of 1996, Order on Remand and
Report and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 9151, para. 1, 23 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 678 (2001)
[hereinafter LEC Order on Remand] (reaffirming conclusion that traffic delivered to an ISP
is interstate but reducing compensation to the ISP, thereby eliminating regulatory arbitrage
opportunities), remanded sub nom. WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 288 F.3d 429 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
110. LEC Order on Remand, supra note 109.
[W]e modify the analysis that led to our determination that ISP-bound traffic falls
outside the scope of section 251(b)(5) and conclude that Congress excluded from
the “telecommunications” traffic subject to reciprocal compensation the traffic
identified in section 251(g), including traffic destined for ISPs. Having found,
although for different reasons than before, that the provisions of section 251(b)(5)
do not extend to ISP-bound traffic, we reaffirm our previous conclusion that
traffic delivered to an ISP is predominantly interstate access traffic subject to
section 201 of the Act, and we establish an appropriate cost recovery mechanism
for the exchange of such traffic.
Id. para. 1. “Based upon the record before us, it appears that the most efficient recovery
mechanism for ISP-bound traffic may be bill and keep, whereby each carrier recovers costs
from its own end-users.” Id. para. 4.
111. WorldCom, Inc., 288 F.3d at 430.
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Fuzzy Math and Creative Statutory Interpretation

On several occasions, appellate courts have chided the FCC for the
assumptions, methodology, and calculations used to determine what
carriers and consumers have to pay for various types of facilities and
service. For example, in the conversion from traditional public utility rateof-return regulation to incentive regulation, the FCC had to determine how
to create opportunities for carriers to benefit financially from efficiency
gains without unreasonably depriving consumers some portion of these
gains. The FCC has required LECs under the “price cap” regulatory
regime112 to share a portion of their earnings in excess of specified rates of
return with their customers by temporarily reducing the price cap ceiling in
a subsequent period. Over several years, the FCC has increased the “Xfactor” attributable to technological efficiency gains and allocated to
consumers. In its performance review order, released in 1997, the
Commission further revised the price cap plan by prescribing a new
productivity X-factor of 6.5%. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the FCC’s requirement that carriers share positive efficiency gains with
consumers, but reversed the FCC for failing to justify adequately the
calculation of a 6% productivity factor coupled with a 0.5% consumer
productivity factor.113 On remand, the FCC addressed the issue of incentive
regulation from a somewhat different perspective, opting to embrace a
proposal of an ad hoc industry trade association known as the Coalition for
Affordable Local and Long Distance Services (“CALLS”).114 The CALLS
proposal eliminated the necessity of adjusting retrospectively the X-factor
in response to the court’s remand by keeping the X-factor at 6.5%, but
targeting reductions to a traffic-sensitive price cap basket as well as the
access charges applied to long-distance, interexchange carriers.115
The FCC and reviewing courts continue having to address aspects of
reforming the process by which LECs charge interexchange carriers for
facilities access to originate and terminate long-distance telephone calls.
Stakeholders devise and propose new ways for recouping the multibillion-

112. The FCC instituted price-cap regulation for the regional Bell operating companies
(“RBOCs”) and GTE in 1991 and permitted other LECs to adopt price-cap regulation
voluntarily, subject to certain conditions. Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant
Carriers, Second Report and Order, 5 F.C.C.R. 6786, para. 262, 267, 68 Rad. Reg.2d (P &
F) 226 (1990).
113. United States Tel. Ass’n v. FCC, 188 F.3d 521, 525, 527 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
114. See Access Charge Reform, Sixth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 12962, para. 1, 20
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 636 (2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded in part, Texas
Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 265 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2001).
115. Id. paras. 141-142.
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dollar local access expense116 even as reviewing courts find deficiencies in
existing rules.117 In a comprehensive and mixed decision, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the FCC properly justified an increase in the
subscriber line charge (“SLC”) caps for residential and single-line business
telephone customers from $3.50 to $6.50 over a period of several years.118
Increases in the SLC provide funds for defraying LEC plant investments on
a pro-rata basis rather than on a usage basis. A usage basis would result in
overcharging and undercharging because much of the investment in the
capability of handling long-distance telephone calls does not vary with
usage. The court also held that the Commission properly justified a
charging policy that recovers most joint and common costs of universal
service directly from end users as an explicit subsidy in lieu of indirect and
flawed subsidies built into long-distance telephone service rates.119 The
court, however, held that the FCC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
establishing a $650 million Universal Service Fund figure and lacked a
rational basis for establishing a 6.5% figure to represent LECs’ productivity
gains for purposes of calculating revised access charges.

XVI. A WAY TO HARMONIZE DIVERGENT
REGULATORY MODELS
A better way to consider the appropriate regulatory regime lies in
distillation of convergent services along a horizontal plane and the
subdivision of these integrated services into multiple layers of services:
Think of Internet access as occurring through the provision of multiple
layers of services: the physical layer that transports an electronic
signal; the operational layer that depends on control software . . . ; the
application layer that uses software that formats information . . . ; and
the content layer . . . . A case can and should be made that the

116. Multi-Association Group (MAG) Plan for Reg. of Interstate Servs. of Non-Price
Cap Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers and Interexchange Carriers, Second Report and
Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 19613, para. 1, 25 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 1 (2001) (proposal of National Rural Telecom Association, National
Telephone Cooperative Association, Organization for the Promotion and Advancement of
Small Telecommunications Companies, and U.S. Telecom Association for access charge
reform applicable to predominantly rural carriers still subject to rate of return regulation).
117. Texas Office of Pub. Util. Counsel, 265 F.3d at 317.
118. See id. at 320, 323. The FCC has initiated a proceeding to examine costs
attributable to the SLC. See Initiation of Cost Review Proceeding for Residential and
Single-Line Business Subscriber Line Charge (SLC) Caps, Public Notice, 16 F.C.C.R.
16705 (2001).
119. Texas Office of Pub. Util. Counsel, 265 F.3d at 324. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals previously stated that “the plain language” of Section 254(e) of the 1996 Act did
not “permit the FCC to maintain any implicit subsidies for universal service support.” Texas
Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 425 (5th Cir. 1999).
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application and content layers fit the definition of “information
services” while the physical and operational layers behave much more
like “telecommunications services.”120

The European Union (“EU”) has acknowledged a simple premise that
other nations, including the United States,121 have failed to appreciate fully:
“The convergence of the telecommunications, media and information
technology sectors means all transmission networks and services should be
covered by a single regulatory framework.”122 The EU approach establishes
a definition for electronic communication network,123 electronic
communication service,124 and information society services,125 a specified
120. Kelley, supra note 78, at 2144.
121. However, a recent Working Paper from the FCC Office of Plans and Policy shows
great appreciation for the EU approach even as the paper correctly notes the difficulty in
implementation outside the EU. “[T]here would seem to be much to recommend the
European framework [e.g., linking significant market power with regulation without
reference to specific technologies or services that have or will converge]. Unfortunately, the
European approach does not fit neatly into U.S. regulatory practice.” J. SCOTT MARCUS, THE
POTENTIAL RELEVANCE TO THE UNITED STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S NEWLY ADOPTED
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS 27 (FCC Office of Plans and Policy,
Working Paper No. 36, July 2002), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/
attachmatch/DOC-224213A2.pdf [hereinafter Marcus Paper].
122. Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March
2002 on a Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and
Services (Framework Directive), 2002 O.J. (L 108) 33, available at http://europa.eu.int/
eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_108/l_10820020424en00330050.pdf.
123. Electronic communications network is defined as:
[T]ransmission systems and, where applicable, switching or routing equipment
and other resources which permit the conveyance of signals by wire, by radio, by
optical or by other electromagnetic means, including satellite networks, fixed
(circuit- and packet-switched, including Internet) and mobile terrestrial networks,
electricity cable systems, to the extent that they are used for the purpose of
transmitting signals, networks used for radio and television broadcasting, and
cable television networks, irrespective of the type of information conveyed.
Id. at 38-39.
124. Electronic communications service is defined as:
[A] service normally provided for remuneration which consists wholly or mainly
in the conveyance of signals on electronic communications networks, including
telecommunications services and transmission services in networks used for
broadcasting, but exclude services providing, or exercising editorial control over,
content transmitted using electronic communications networks and services; it
does not include information society services, as defined in Article 1 of Directive
98/34/EC, which do not consist wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on
electronic communications networks.
Id. at 39.
125. Information society services refers to:
[A]ny service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic
means and at the individual request of a recipient of services. For the purposes of
this definition:—”at a distance” means that the service is provided without the
parties being simultaneously present,—”by electronic means” means that the
service is sent initially and received at its destination by means of electronic
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set of information services where the telecommunications carriage
component can be recognized as subordinate to the information service
provided, e.g., home banking.126 But rather than apply regulation based on
specific service definitions, the EU’s framework establishes a process for
determining whether to apply regulation and when to remove it.127
Additionally, the European approach establishes a harmonized, horizontal
regulatory model that subjects ICE industries to government oversight
geared to remedy-specific instances of ineffective competition, solely “in
markets where there are one or more undertakings with significant market
equipment for the processing (including digital compression) and storage of data,
and entirely transmitted, conveyed and received by wire, by radio, by optical
means or by other electromagnetic means,—”at the individual request of a
recipient of services” means that the service is provided through the transmission
of data on individual request.
Directive 98/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 1998
Amending Directive 98/34/EC Laying Down a Procedure for the Provision of Information
in the Field of Technical Standards and Regulations, 1998 O.J. (L 217) 21; see also Annex
V.
126. Information society services include:
Electronic commerce: often called, confusingly and incorrectly, “teleshopping” or
described as an “electronic purchasing system”, electronic commerce would
enable the consumer to order products directly via his television set or computer
terminal.
Distance teaching: distance teaching would be provided interactively; it would
rely on an audiovisual aid and would enable the student to answer questions,
choose alternatives, and receive an assessment of his/her abilities.
Electronic publications/information services: this term covers a wide range of
services such as news, weather reports, online databases, etc. For services such as
travel information or information about the times of various events, one of the
possibilities often offered by electronic commerce is direct booking.
Professional teleservices: professional services such as telemedicine and legal
advice afford an expert the opportunity of giving advice from his place of work to
his client’s home with total interactivity between the two.
Home banking: clients can obtain information about their accounts and carry out
financial transactions directly and at a distance via a/the network.
Online entertainment: this includes services such as online video games or videoon-demand which would enable the consumer to order a programme or a film at
any time, watch it on his screen and manipulate its content (ranging from fast
winding or rewinding to making wholesale changes).
Regulatory Transparency in the Internal Market for Information Society Services, Proposal
for a European Parliament and Council Directive Amending for the Third Time Directive
83/189/EEC Laying Down a Procedure for the Provision of Information in the Field of
Technical Standards and Regulations, I.A.1., at http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/legreg/
docs/regtrans.html (July 24, 1996).
127. The new EU regulatory framework requires “that certain regulatory impositions
should be imposed in the presence of SMP [significant market power], and lifted in its
absence, [perhaps] express[ing] [a] regulatory desiderata and the desired timing of
regulation and deregulation more clearly and more simply than do equivalent U.S. statutes.”
Marcus Paper, supra note 121, at 27.

FRIEDEN FINAL

248

3/5/2003 11:36 AM

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55

power, . . . and where national and Community competition law remedies
are not sufficient to address the problem.”128
The EU approach separates content from conduit and subjects either
horizontal layer to regulation only where market distortions have occurred,
or potentially may occur in view of the market power exercised by one or
more stakeholders.129 The primary regulatory oversight model derives from
general antitrust/competition policy rather than from an industry- or
service-specific predicate. Regulation occurs if and only if competition
does not exist in a particular geographic or specific market, and existing
regulatory obligations may be withdrawn on the basis of market analysis.130

XVII. CONCLUSION
The FCC has attempted to cause common carrier regulation to
evaporate by reclassifying the vertical regulatory model into which existing
telecommunications services fit. Telecommunications law permits the
Commission to eliminate Title II common carrier responsibilities on an ad
hoc basis, but the Commission appears unwilling or undisciplined to use
the deregulatory flexibility available to it. Instead, the Commission appears
intent on eliminating any telecommunications service if it can be subsumed
within and subordinate to a cable or information service. This semantic
tinkering satisfies the Commission’s dichotomous thinking that services
must fit entirely in one vertical model, but only by creating two ambiguous
and not necessarily mutually exclusive categories: telecommunications as a
capability or building block for another service, and telecommunications as
a service in its own right.
To sustain several parallel vertical models (telecommunications
services, cable services, information services), the Commission has erected
a
mechanism
for
ignoring,
subordinating,
or
dismissing

128. Public Consultation on a Draft Commission Recommendation on Relevant Product
and Service Markets within the Electronic Communications Sector Susceptible to Ex Ante
Regulations in Accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council on a Common Regulatory Framework for Electric Communication Networks
and Services, Commission of the European Communities Working Document, at
http://www.oftel.gov.uk/ind_info/eu_directives/draft_rec_relmar.pdf (June 17, 2002).
129. For an overview of the EU approach, see Europe’s Liberalised Telecommunications
Market—A Guide to the Rules of the Game, Commission of the European Communities
Staff Working Document, at http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/
userguide-en.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2002).
130. Proposed New Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks
and Services, Draft Guidelines on Market Analysis and the Calculation of Significant
Economic Power, Commission of the European Communities Working Document,
available at http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/com2001-175-5en.pdf
(Mar. 28, 2001).
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telecommunications functionality that previously constituted regulated
telecommunications services. But the identifiable telecommunications
service function does not evaporate, particularly in light of the fact that
carriers can take telecommunications functionality used as a building block
for an information service and easily configure it for conventional
telecommunications services. To achieve preferred deregulatory status,
these carriers can just as easily mask the telecommunications service
functionality by emphasizing its supporting or subordinate role in the
provision of an information service. In either instance, the
telecommunications functionality exists as do the common carrier
regulatory responsibilities, absent a specific deregulatory initiative meeting
the requirements of Section 10 of the 1996 Act.
The FCC cannot cut corners by making an artificial distinction
between telecommunications used to transport an information service and
telecommunications services. In both instances a telecommunications
service exists, and the carrier providing the telecommunications should be
regulated under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934 unless and
until it can qualify for section-by-section deregulation based on the public
interest and favorable marketplace conditions.
The horizontal regulatory approach championed by the European
Commission offers a rational and consistent regulatory model alternative.
Content and conduit fit into separate regulatory classifications with content
providers generally exempt from regulation. Conduit providers, regardless
of the medium, typically fit within conduct and economic regulation that
can be calibrated as a function of the particular carrier’s market share and
the level of competition in the various conduit submarkets. Regardless of
whether telecommunications provides transport for an information service
or offers standalone transport, the conduit function should be regulated to
the extent any conduit operator has market power or bottleneck control, and
any market still requires government oversight to promote sustainable
competition and consumer protection.
The European Commission has devised a more straightforward and
viable regulatory model than its U.S. counterpart. However, just because
the EU arguably has a better model does not guarantee that any nation will
embrace it. Indeed, different political circumstances all but foreclose the
application of the EU horizontal model in the United States. No regulatory
model that increases the scope of governmental oversight will work in the
United States, no matter how rational and consistent its application. The
FCC may express reticence in extending legacy regulation, but on the other
hand, it emphasizes preexisting, legacy legal and regulatory status, except
when it suits its grand regulatory mission to offer something new.
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Accordingly, the FCC will extend the status quo of regulated status to
telecommunications service providers and unregulated status to information
service providers. Likewise, the FCC will make do with inconsistent
regulatory models that extend non-common carrier, private carrier status to
cable television operators, even when these ventures offer what appears to
be telecommunications services. But in an effort to eliminate regulatory
burdens for any venture providing any information service, the common
carrier vertical model has become inoperative.
Congress did not authorize the FCC to eliminate common carriage
regulatory status when carriers provide telecommunications services. The
FCC can only selectively and incrementally eliminate aspects of Title II
regulation on an ad hoc basis when and if changed circumstances support
deregulation. By adopting the EU horizontal approach, the FCC could
calibrate and largely reduce telecommunications common carrier regulation
without eviscerating a traditional and still legislatively valid classification.
Sadly, this approach will not generate the slightest interest or support in the
United States.

